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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Long before the development of the regulatory takings doctrine, 
courts discussed claims of uncompensated confiscatory practices in the 
language of substantive due process and physical takings. Judicial 
opinions even mixed both narratives in reaching conclusions that did 
not provide a clear basis for the decision.1 As the degree of permanence, 
directness, and physicality of the government act diminished, discus-
sions of the claims included consideration of the impact of the govern-
ment act on use value, the substantiality of interference, and foresee-
ability.2 These factors were important to distinguish between regular 
torts like trespass and nuisance, on the one hand, and physical takings 
and substantive due process deprivations, on the other.  
 
 * All rights reserved 2019. Lynda L. Butler. Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, 
Property Rights Project, College of William & Mary Law School. B.S. College of William & 
Mary; J.D. University of Virginia. I would like to thank the Law School for its summer  
research grant support. Much appreciation to Dakota Newton, Lindsey Whitlow, Andrea 
Gumushian, and Juan Abad for their superb research assistance, and Felicia Burton for her 
dedicated word processing support. 
 1. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding 
for the first time a comprehensive zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power, 
concluding that the ordinance did not unlawfully confiscate the affected property’s value nor 
deprive the owner of property without due process of law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 
394, 413–14 (1915) (upholding a law prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within certain 
areas that had become residential despite the loss in value of a business begun lawfully); 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624, 671 (1887) (upholding a law prohibiting the manufac-
ture or sale of alcoholic beverages, even though the business was begun lawfully, because 
the public health, safety, and morals required discontinuance of the use). 
 2. Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1687, 1721–40 (2015) [hereinafter Butler, Governance Function]. 
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Then, in 1922, the Court announced what is now called the regula-
tory takings doctrine, declaring that regulations could go too far by 
confiscating economically viable use. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Holmes explained that such regulatory confiscation was functionally 
equivalent to a physical taking.3 It took over fifty years for the Court 
to flush out the meaning of this new doctrine with an ad hoc, multi-
factor test.4 Even now, significant questions remain about how to 
measure economic impact, how to balance relevant factors, how to  
handle nuisance-like impacts of property use, and whether compelling 
public interests ever could justify significant economic impact without 
payment of just compensation.5 Two themes underlying these issues 
involve the importance of the reasonable expectations of property  
owners and the role of state property law. 
The 2017 decision by the United States Supreme Court in Murr v. 
Wisconsin has heightened interest in these questions about the regu-
latory takings doctrine. In Murr, the Court concluded that the relevant 
property interest to consider in resolving a regulatory takings claim 
was the owners’ holdings in two adjacent lots.6 The two lots were 
merged under state and local land use laws after coming under com-
mon ownership because of each lot’s nonconforming size.7 The logic of 
the majority opinion highlights the continuing tensions between  
substantive due process and takings analysis. That logic relies on a 
new multi-factor test to define the property affected by the government  
action for purposes of conducting regulatory takings analysis.8 Accord-
ing to the Court, the test is designed to determine “whether reasonable 
expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to  
anticipate that his holdings would be treated” as one and not as  
separate parcels.9 The Court cautioned, however, that a landowner’s 
reasonable expectations should recognize that legitimate land use 
 
 3. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). 
 4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The three-part test con-
siders the economic impact on the property, interference with investment-backed expecta-
tions, and the character of the government action. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land 
Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 43–45, 103–04 (2014) (discussing the past ten years 
of Public Use Clause interpretations, and the future of physical and regulatory takings  
jurisprudence). 
 6. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948 (2017). 
 7. See id. 
 8. The factors include: “the treatment of the land under state and local law; the phys-
ical characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the regulated land.” Id. at 1945. 
See also Maureen E. Brady, Essay, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr 
v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 55–56 (2017) (dis-
cussing how Murr “poses a severe risk to constitutional property federalism,” undermining 
the property law of individual states and replacing that law with “an analysis of reasonable 
property rules and expectations that is divorced from jurisdictional boundaries”).  
 9. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
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restrictions may apply to the property and affect value or limit use in 
light of the physical characteristics of the property.10 The majority 
opinion added that “reasonable land-use regulations do not work a  
taking,” but rather are “a legitimate exercise of the government’s  
police power”11—a statement that sounds remarkably like due process 
analysis. 
This article examines the confusion surrounding constitutional  
protection of property under the substantive due process and takings 
clauses, using Murr as a springboard for reconsidering the substantive 
due process/takings distinction and asking whether the regulatory 
takings doctrine should remain a viable constitutional concept despite 
its muddled principles. While powerful reasons support treating as 
compensable economic regulations that are functionally equivalent  
to physical takings,12 important differences between physical and  
regulatory takings need to be recognized as limits to the degree of 
equivalence possible and therefore to the regulatory takings doctrine. 
A look back at the evolutionary paths of substantive due process,  
physical takings, and regulatory takings reveals those differences and 
provides some answers to questions about the regulatory takings  
doctrine. Defining the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine in  
light of those differences, especially the forgotten history of regulatory 
takings, should provide more consistency, help to resolve constitu-
tional property’s denominator puzzle, and allow regulatory takings to 
remain a viable constitutional concept.  
II.   MURR V. WISCONSIN AND CONSTITUTIONAL  
PROPERTY’S DENOMINATOR PUZZLE 
For decades the Supreme Court has generally agreed that regula-
tions producing a total diminution in value should be compensated.13 
It has struggled, however, with identifying the point when a total eco-
nomic loss occurs. Central to that struggle is the choice of the property 
benchmark or denominator. The Court’s repeated attempts to define 
the benchmark reveal a basic unease with the question and with  
the choices before it. A look at the development of the denominator 
debate over the years and the Court’s recent efforts in Murr to resolve 
it provides an important backdrop for exploring the inherent limits of 
regulatory takings.  
 
 10. See id. at 1945–46.  
 11. Id. at 1947.  
 12. See Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed 
to Clean up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151, 184–89 (2017) 
(discussing some of those reasons). 
 13. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–29 (1992). 
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A.   The Puzzle 
From the very beginning, the regulatory takings doctrine has had 
a denominator problem. In introducing the concept of regulatory tak-
ings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes used the re-
maining property as the benchmark—or denominator—for measuring 
the economic impact of the statute.14 Once he chose the remaining coal 
that could not be mined under the statute as the basis for comparing 
the before and after effect of the challenged law, the outcome of the 
case was determined. All of the remaining property could no longer be 
mined, producing a 100% loss.15 The dissenting opinion by Brandeis, 
on the other hand, focused on the property as a whole in measuring 
the economic impact of the law on the property.16 According to 
Brandeis, the appropriate approach is to compare the value of the af-
fected property—the coal kept in place—with the value of the property 
as a whole. Brandeis explained that “[t]he sum of the rights in the 
parts can not [sic] be greater than the rights in the whole.”17 
Cases decided after Mahon have, for the most part, taken the  
approach of Justice Brandeis, comparing the value of the affected  
property to the value of the property as a whole in determining the 
extent of the diminution in value caused by the government act.18 In 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, for example, the 
Court concluded that the owner of Grand Central Terminal could not 
vertically segment the property and treat the owner’s interests in  
developing above the historic property as the whole property impacted 
by the government’s denial of a development application.19 The land-
owner had argued that the government’s decision not to allow devel-
opment of the air space above the terminal totally took the owner’s air 
rights.20 In rejecting this vertical severance argument, the Court  
explained that “‘[t]aking[s]’ jurisprudence does not divide a single  
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights 
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”21 Rather the 
Court’s focus is on rights in the property “as a whole.”22  
 
 14. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413–15 (1922). Epstein disagrees that Mahon 
is the source of the denominator problem, instead attributing the origins of the problem to 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Epstein, supra note 12, at 162–
63. 
 15. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.  
 16. See id. at 416, 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 17. Id.  
 18. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 644 
(1993); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). 
 19. 438 U.S. 104, 117, 130–31 (1978).  
 20. Id. at 130. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 130–31.  
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Soon after deciding Penn Central, the Court rejected use of a con-
ceptual severance argument in Andrus v. Allard.23 Endorsing the  
“aggregate” or “as a whole” approach, the Court held that a regulation 
prohibiting the sale of lawfully acquired eagle feathers and other cov-
ered bird parts was not a taking.24 After observing that the law did not 
result in a physical invasion or forced surrender of possession, the 
Court explained that “the denial of one traditional property right does 
not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a 
full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the 
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its 
entirety.”25 Although the regulation did not allow the most profitable 
use of their property, diminution in value was not enough to find a 
taking. In Andrus the owners still retained the rights to possess, enjoy, 
donate, and devise the property.26  
The Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council27 
did more than any other case to highlight the outcome-determinative 
nature of the denominator question. In Lucas the Court decided that a 
government law denying all economically viable use was categorically 
a regulatory taking without any “case-specific inquiry into the public 
interest advanced in support of the restraint.”28 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Scalia offered a number of justifications for this categorical 
rule. In addition to being functionally equivalent to a physical appro-
priation, a law that deprived the property owner of all economically 
viable use could not simply be “adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life” to promote the public good in ways that would provide 
the owner with “average reciprocity of advantage.”29 The Court 
acknowledged, however, that its decision in Lucas was not providing 
guidance on the appropriate property benchmark because the record 
before it assumed a total loss.30 Instead the Court indicated that reso-
lution of the benchmark question “may lie in how the owner’s reason-
able expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of property—
i.e., whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal 
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land” allegedly 
taken by government regulation.31 Because of the Court’s adoption of 
 
 23. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).  
 24. See id. at 64, 67–68.   
 25. Id. at 65–66. 
 26. See id. at 66.  
 27. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  
 28. Id. at 1015. 
 29. Id. at 1017–18 (first quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978), then quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 30. Id. at 1016 n.7. 
 31. Id.  
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the per se approach, the choice of denominator became even more crit-
ical. If the regulated property interest was also the benchmark, then 
the diminution in value would always be total and therefore a per se 
taking unless the restriction was inherent in the owner’s title, part of 
the background principles of common law property and nuisance.32 The 
public interest, no matter how compelling, could not be considered if 
the per se approach applied.  
Then, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court rejected a land-
owner’s horizontal severance argument, concluding that the govern-
ment’s denial of a permit to fill eleven acres of wetlands on an eight-
een-acre tract was not a regulatory taking.33 The Court explained that 
the landowner could still develop on the upland portion of the tract.34 
Despite expressing some “discomfort” about the denominator issue, 
the Court continued to look at the property as a whole in evaluating 
the economic impact of the regulatory decision.35 Development of a res-
idence on the upland area provided sufficient economically viable use 
to avoid a regulatory taking even though the denial deprived the owner 
of the ability to pursue a use of potentially greater value—a private 
beach club.36 
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, the Court similarly concluded that the appropriate focus  
in evaluating the economic impact of a law was on the property as a 
whole.37 Landowners had argued that temporary moratoria delaying 
economic use of their land denied them all economically viable use  
for the moratoria period and therefore was a regulatory taking.38  
The regional planning agency had adopted the moratoria to give the 
agency time to develop a plan for protecting the water quality of Lake 
Tahoe.39 The Court rejected the effort to “disaggregate[] . . . property 
into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at issue”  
and held that the temporary prohibition of economic use was not per 
 
 32. See id. at 1029.  
 33. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615, 631–32 (2001). 
 34. See id. at 616.  
 35. Id. at 630–32. 
 36. See id. (describing the denominator problem as a “difficult, persisting question” but 
noting that the landowner failed to challenge the denominator test prior to reaching the 
Supreme Court, and instead accepting how the case came to the Court – on “the premise that 
petitioner’s entire parcel serves as the basis” for the takings claim). 
 37. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 
(2002). 
 38. See id. at 320. 
 39. See id. at 308–12.  
2020] MURR AND REGULATORY TAKINGS  
 
105
se a taking.40 The Court explained, “defining the property interest 
taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular.”41 
The denominator question reflects both a potential for windfalls 
and a problem of manipulation. Under the “as a whole” approach, the 
government usually wins, able to achieve a regulatory goal without 
paying for diminution in value or sometimes even for a lost strand  
in the bundle of property rights.42 This result should not matter when 
the regulation addresses a harmful use or otherwise holds property 
owners accountable for the impacts of their use. Nothing in our  
Constitution guarantees property owners protection from laws that 
force internalization of the costs of their land uses. The result might 
matter, however, when government is able to capture some of the  
property’s value through regulation after manipulating the regulatory 
context to get a favorable “whole.”  Under the “regulated portion” or 
“remaining property” approach, however, the private property owner 
usually wins and may even capture some of the value provided by  
public goods or services or may harm those goods or services. The prop-
erty owner now has the incentive to segment her property interests 
before pursuing development plans. While shaping the regulatory  
context allows manipulation by government actors, segmentation  
allows manipulation by property owners. When the opportunity for 
manipulation overlaps with the potential for windfalls (and the  
capture of value), the Court faces a no-win situation in resolving a reg-
ulatory takings claim. Regardless of the Court’s choice of denominator, 
the decision often leads to unsatisfactory constitutional law. Identify-
ing when both problems overlap in a regulatory context thus is critical 
to improving the Court’s options and decision-making.  
When, then, does a windfall arise in a regulatory takings context? 
A windfall generally exists when a party receives a benefit or ad-
vantage that it did not bargain for, invest in, or buy.43 When both  
parties have faced a potential windfall and the situation did not in-
volve manipulation or bad faith behavior on their part, some courts 
have resolved disputes involving this pure windfall situation by  
looking for ways to make each innocent party with a reasonable con-
nection to the windfall better off. For example, in a case about a record-
setting homerun baseball hit by Barry Bonds, the court split the  
baseball’s value between the party who had the baseball in his glove 
before being mobbed by a group of fans and the innocent bystander 
 
 40. Id. at 331–32.  
 41. Id. at 331.  
 42. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944–45 (explaining how the denominator question is “outcome 
determinative”).  
 43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (defining non-bargained-for benefits). 
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who picked up the ball after it rolled out of the melee.44 When a wind-
fall situation, on the other hand, involves bad faith or manipulation, 
common law courts have looked to principles of restitution and equity 
to rule against the wrongdoer and award the windfall to the innocent 
party having the closest or best connection to the property. In a case 
involving an egg washing machine, for instance, the court held that 
the wrongdoer who misappropriated the owner’s egg washing machine 
had to disgorge all profits made from the wrongful use of the machine 
instead of just paying the fair rental value of the machine.45 The 
wrongdoer had taken the machine out of the owner’s storage area and 
used it after a labor shortage caused labor costs to rise above the costs 
of renting the machine.46 
Whether windfalls, or non-bargained-for benefits, arising in a reg-
ulatory context involve manipulation through abuse of power or  
rights is a more complex question. Sometimes the answer may be tied 
to notions of fairness. Other times it may be tied to views on the allo-
cation of power between government and property owners. Three  
opinions in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island illustrate different approaches 
to defining windfalls in the regulatory context.47 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Kennedy described a windfall as arising when a state 
law “would work a critical alteration to the nature of property.”48  
Declaring that government “may not by this means secure a windfall 
for itself,” Justice Kennedy explained how the law being challenged 
removed the ability of “the newly regulated landowner . . . to transfer 
the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation.”49 In Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, she described windfalls in regulatory 
takings cases as “an important indicium of fairness.”50 She explained 
how government could have too much power if existing regulations al-
ways dictated the reasonableness of a property owner’s expectations, 
while property owners could “reap [unacceptable] windfalls” if existing 
regulations played no role in regulatory takings analysis.51 She there-
fore rejected a per se approach that forever made the “temporal  
relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition”  
 
 44. See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 Cal. Super. LEXIS 5206 (Dec. 18, 2002) (applying 
the principle of equitable division); see also Keron v. Cashman, 33 A. 1055 (1896) (holding 
that because each boy had an equal legal claim to the property, they each had an equal 
entitlement to the property).  
 45. See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 653–54 (Wash. 1946). 
 46. See id.  
 47. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 48. Id. at 627.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 51. Id.  
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determinative in a partial regulatory takings case.52 Instead, both the 
time of a regulation’s enactment and the time of title acquisition would 
remain material to the analysis.53 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, 
would always award the windfall to the property owner instead of the 
government, “which not only did not lose something it owned, but is  
. . . the cause of the miscarriage of ‘fairness.’ ”54 In his concurring opin-
ion in Palazzolo, he explains how there is nothing unlawful or  
unfair about buying land subject to a development restriction and  
then developing the land to its full value after getting the restriction 
invalidated.55  
If a government regulation promotes the common good while caus-
ing significant but not total diminution in value, has the government 
unfairly received a windfall or benefit? Those who do not believe  
that government regulation should be able to cause a significant dim-
inution in value without providing compensation when no direct harm 
results from the property’s use would probably conclude that govern-
ment has wrongfully and unconstitutionally taken some of the owner’s 
property interests.56 Those who believe that the boundaries of a tract 
of land existing at the time of acquisition are inviolate would also likely 
conclude that a regulation depriving the landowner of economically  
viable use of part of the tract results in an unconstitutional windfall. 
Such a situation would arise, for instance, when a local government 
imposed front and side setback requirements on the development of 
land for residential purposes.  
This thinking, however, ignores government’s role in adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life, including the spillovers of  
private land use borne by third parties, the costs to public goods and 
services, and the interaction of the parts (here the individual tracts) 
making up the whole.57 If a regulation adjusts the benefits and burdens 
of economic life or provides average reciprocity of advantage, the  
property owner is not likely being singled out or treated unfairly. If 
instead a regulation imposes a disproportionate share of the costs on 
a landowner, then the regulation probably produces an inappropriate 
windfall for government. When government extracts a public benefit 
from a few, the government action raises concerns that the action is 
 
 52. Id. at 632.  
 53. Id. at 632–35. 
 54. Id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).  
 55. Id. at 635–37.  
 56. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 12, at 183–84 (concluding that “there is no obvious 
tipping point . . . when compensation is suddenly required” for significant diminution in 
value caused by regulation). 
 57. This interaction can produce cumulative harm and stress on the whole. See Lynda 
L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1215, 1252–53, 1260–
62 (2017) [hereinafter Butler, Property as Management]. 
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unfairly redistributing wealth from the private property owner to  
the government.58 An unfair windfall also could occur if government 
appropriates resources for a uniquely public function in a way that de-
nies an owner economically viable use59 or if government alone  
defines when expectations are reasonable.60 Because the focus of the 
compensable takings inquiry is on what the property owner has lost, 
not on what may generally be gained by others, a windfall received by 
government should not, in and of itself, be enough to find a regulatory 
taking as long as that gain has not been acquired unfairly or from the 
abuse of power.61 
An important step in identifying problematic situations in the reg-
ulatory takings context thus involves understanding the source of a 
potential windfall and determining whether the windfall has been 
wrongfully acquired by manipulation, whether by abuse of rights or 
abuse of power. Sometimes the source of the windfall is self-created. 
The property owner, for example, might have speculated that a shift 
in the market or a change in land use regulations would occur. If that 
shift does not occur and government then benefits after applying the 
existing regulations to the property, the property owner assumes the 
risk of this type of loss. Other times the regulatory context has been 
shaped by the failure or limitations of the property system in handling 
the harmful impacts and costs of private land use. This failure may be 
due to the exclusion-based strategy that the conventional property  
system uses in managing the exercise of property rights or to the  
economics-based incentive structure of the system. The management 
strategy and incentive structure are owner-centric, limit consideration 
of third-party interests, and sometimes experience difficulty  
responding to changing conditions, technological advances, or new 
 
 58. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (noting that the 
Court “has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when . . . economic in-
juries caused by public action [should] be compensated . . . rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated on a few persons”); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) 
(describing how “[the] Fifth Amendment guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole. . . .”). 
 59. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62, 264–67 (1946) (holding that low-
lying military flights over private land directly caused a taking by preventing use as a 
chicken farm and is just “as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conven-
tional entry upon it”).  
 60. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632, 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the state 
“wields far too much power” when “existing regulations dictate the reasonableness of [in-
vestment-backed] expectations in every instance”).  
 61. See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234–36 (2003) (concluding 
that a law requiring attorneys to put client funds that could not otherwise earn interest in 
accounts earning interest for programs providing indigent legal services did not require com-
pensation because the owner did not lose any interest).   
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knowledge.62 Regardless of the reason for the failure, the property  
system needs to address its limitations so it can respond effectively  
to new conditions and crises. Finally, government’s decision-making 
process or its execution of laws might have played a role in shaping a 
landowner’s expectations by inviting or authorizing the development 
that is now being constrained by new regulations.  
Consider, for example, a landowner who owns a ten-acre tract, one 
acre of which consists of wetlands that cannot be developed under a 
wetlands law already in effect. If government prevents the develop-
ment of the wetlands, the owner has lost all economically viable use of 
that one acre—a taking under Lucas if the benchmark is the affected 
portion but not if the ten-acre tract is viewed as a whole. Either option 
allows one party to manipulate the situation. Suppose further that the 
owner submits a plan to subdivide the tract into ten lots, with one of 
the lots consisting of the wetlands. Even under the “as a whole” ap-
proach, the owner has lost all economically viable use of the wetlands 
lot and has suffered a taking unless the whole is defined as the origi-
nal, undivided ten-acre tract or unless knowledge or foreseeability of 
the wetlands law legitimately shaped reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.63 The possibility of subdivision allows the owner to  
manipulate the situation to the owner’s advantage unless the entire 
original tract is the whole. If, instead, the government had approved 
the subdivision as the owner proposed but later denied the owner’s  
application for a permit to fill the wetlands under a law already in 
effect at the time of subdivision, government has failed to regulate  
effectively. Government had control over the subdivision process,  
allowing the subdivision of the one acre of wetlands, and could have 
prevented or avoided the strategic manipulation by the owner. By  
approving the subdivision, the locality has helped to shape the owner’s 
expectations, which could matter under takings analysis.  
Now suppose that the owner subdivides the ten-acre tract, with the 
one acre of wetlands constituting one lot. After the subdivision, the 
 
 62. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 57, at 1217–18, 1220–22, 1226–28, 
1239–41. Earlier in time, for example, waterfront businesses and localities discharged un-
treated wastewater into navigable waters. After the harmful impact of the discharges  
became better understood, governments began regulating these discharges and protecting 
public rights in navigable waters. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine 
Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (using the public trust doctrine to restrict the withdrawal of 
water from Mono Lake when the withdrawals threatened the integrity of the Lake). For a 
discussion of how a governance strategy provides greater analytical capacity to resolve  
constitutional issues involving shared resources subject to complex property arrangements, 
see Butler, Governance Function, supra note 2, at 1757–67. 
 63. Because of the Court’s decision in Palazzolo, notice of regulations in effect at the 
time of acquisition of property cannot be determinative of a takings claim. See Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 626–28, 631 (discussing the notice issue and describing how framing the wetlands 
parcel as separate and distinct from the uplands parcel could change the denominator and 
potentially present a total deprivation of value, depending on the approach taken).   
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government passes a wetlands law preventing development of the one 
acre of wetlands in response to new studies about the importance of 
wetlands to ecological integrity and public welfare. The government in 
this third scenario is likely to make a Murr-type argument, asserting 
that the ten-acre tract should be viewed as a whole. The situation now 
could resemble Lucas, depending on the degree of development of the 
surrounding area and the condition of the ecological resources being 
protected by the new law. In Lucas, the development of the surround-
ing beaches was too far along for a prohibition on development of two 
noncontiguous lots to be effective.64 Whether changing conditions or 
new knowledge about those conditions led to the adoption of the  
wetlands law would matter. But the current degree of development in 
the area and the potential effectiveness of the law also would matter.  
The above scenarios identify several categories of regulatory set-
tings that could involve overlap of potential windfalls and problematic 
manipulation. In the first scenario involving a law already in effect  
at the time of development, the property owner could gain a windfall 
by manipulating his rights under existing law. The landowner had 
subdivided the wetlands portion of the tract into a separate lot, hoping 
to prevail with a Lucas takings claim if the fill permit were denied. 
The landowner intentionally pursued ecological segmentation of his 
property yet could have foreseen denial of the permit under an already  
existing law protecting wetlands. Surely an unhealthy manipulation 
of rights exists when a landowner segments the property to try to fit 
under Lucas and overcome application of a law protecting against  
environmental harms of land use. In the second scenario involving an 
existing law, one unit of government approved the subdivision even 
though the wetlands law was in effect, but then another denied the fill 
permit. The narrow economic incentives of the property system help to 
explain this management failure. The mainstream property system 
generally ignores the true scales of private land use and instead  
promotes the owner’s economic incentives and the maximization of  
social welfare. The system is unable to respond effectively to certain 
serious problems involving high transaction costs, collection action 
problems, and difficult-to-measure spillovers like diffused or cumula-
tive harms. The limitations of the economics-based property system 
thus make the development of solutions within in the current system 
difficult to achieve.65  
 
 64. William A. Fischel, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: A Photographic Essay 
(Feb. 1995), http://www.dartmouth.edu/%7Ewfischel/lucasessay.html [https://perma.cc/ 
D9GM-TBKA]. 
 65. The economics-based incentive structure of the property system contributes to the 
development of investment-backed expectations that do not account for serious external 
harms. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 57, at 1257–59. For example,  
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The third scenario involves new knowledge or changing conditions 
not specifically attributable to either party and therefore less likely to 
involve an overlap of windfalls and the potential for manipulation. For 
instance, when technological advances eventually allowed the removal 
of most of the coal in a mine’s support columns without jeopardizing 
miners’ safety, the Supreme Court concluded, in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, that a law passed to prevent surface subsidence went 
too far and took all commercially practical use of the coal.66 According 
to the Court, the law was, in effect, confiscating the remaining mineral 
estate of the coal company for the benefit of the surface owners  
contrary to their private property transactions.67 What further 
strengthened the coal company’s position was the distinct recognition 
given to mineral estates under Pennsylvania law.68 A closer call may 
well involve the development of new technology that allows the  
withdrawal of oil or gas from shale deposits through the use of deep 
horizontal drilling, sometimes beginning miles away.69 When the  
development of new technology or scientific understandings leads to 
new ways to exploit natural resources, reforms to traditional laws  
governing property rights in those natural resources should be allowed 
to address issues raised by the new technology without necessarily 
having to pay just compensation. Conceptual segmentation of inter-
connected resources should not control regulatory takings analysis,  
especially when the new use causes harm to interests in connected  
resources that was not foreseen at the time of the private transactions.  
A discussion of the Murr decision will now address the complexities 
of windfall and regulatory situations that have led to the unsatisfac-
tory denominator choices before the Court.  
  
 
Manhattan developers are clamoring to build along the southwest edge of Central Park, 
dubbed “Billionaire‘s Row.” These apartments and condominiums will cast shadows on por-
tions of the park, dropping the temperature by twenty degrees and harming vegetation. See 
Jenna McKnight, Wave of super-tall towers in Manhattan sparks protests over shadows, 
DEZEEN, (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/11/supertall-skinny-skyscrapers-
towers-manhattan-new-york-shop-architects-robert-stern-rafaely-vinoly-jean-nouvel-
portzamparc-controversy-protest/ [https://perma.cc/LQD9-LPDH]. 
 66. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1922). 
 67. Id. at 415.  
 68. Id. at 414–15.  
 69. For a discussion of issues surrounding hydraulic fracturing, or fracking as it is more 
commonly known, see David L. Callies & Chynna Stone, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 
1 J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2014); Tim Flannery, Fury over Fracking, N.Y. REVIEW OF  
BOOKS, (Apr. 21 2016), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/21/fury-over-fracking/ 
[https://perma.cc/V6KB-UP6P]; Amy Goodman, Shale-Shocked Citizens Fight Back, 
TRUTHDIG (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.truthdig.com/articles/shale-shocked-citizens-fight-
back [https://perma.cc/ET7W-XDDT]. 
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B.   The Murr Opinion   
The controversy in Murr involved land use regulations that  
prevented the separate development or sale of adjoining lots held  
under common ownership when the lots were substandard in size.70 
The tracts were located in an area covered by the Wild and Scenic  
Rivers legislation limiting development to protect “the wild, scenic and 
recreational qualities of the river for present and future generations.”71 
One of the protective devices used under the law was a building lot law 
that prevented separate development of a lot having less than one acre 
of land suitable for development.72 A grandfather clause, however,  
allowed a lot substandard at the effective date of the regulation to be 
used as a distinct building site.73 But if another substandard adjacent 
lot subsequently came under common ownership, a merger provision 
prevented the adjacent lots from being developed or sold separately.74  
The lots at issue in Murr each had less than one acre suitable  
for development due to their topography.75 Petitioners’ parents had 
purchased their non-conforming lots at different times before the 
building lot restriction took effect.76 After the lots came under common 
ownership, the merger provision treated the non-conforming lots as 
one parcel for purposes of use and development, blocking the landown-
ers from selling one of the lots to finance new development on the 
other.77 When the local government denied their variance application, 
the landowners sued in state court, claiming a regulatory taking of  
the lot they planned to sell due to their near total loss of economically 
viable use.78 Petitioners’ evidence of the loss included appraisals of 
$771,000 for the lots if separately developed, $698,300 for the lots as 
regulated, $373,000 for the lot they wanted to retain and redevelop, 
and $40,000 for the lot they were not allowed to sell separately.79 The 
state courts ruled for the government, concluding that the landowners 
still could use and enjoy both tracts of land together and that the 
 
 70. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017).  
 71. Under the Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the St. Croix River acquired federal 
protection by 1972. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1274(a)(6), (9) (2012). This designation meant that  
Wisconsin was required to develop a management program for the river. See WIS. STAT. § 
30.27 (2019) (regarding Lower St. Croix River preservation).   
 72. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 1940–41. 
 78. Id. at 1941. Flooding on one of the lots apparently motivated the decision to build a 
new cabin on that lot. See Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 837, 841 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2011). 
 79. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.  
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diminution in value was not significant.80 The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals further explained that regulatory takings analysis focuses “on 
the Murrs’ property as a whole[.]”81 The appellate court stressed that  
the landowners “could not reasonably have expected to use the lots 
separately because they [should have known about] existing zoning 
laws[.]”82 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began his takings analy-
sis with a brief review of the development of regulatory takings  
jurisprudence. After discussing the origins of the doctrine in Mahon, 
Justice Kennedy identified two guidelines relevant to the Murr contro-
versy: the categorical rule that a regulation denying all economically 
viable use generally would be a regulatory taking and the “complex of 
factors” that must be considered when a regulation restricts use but 
does not deprive all economically viable use.83 Even the categorical 
rule, however, had a “caveat recognizing the relevance of state law and 
land-use customs”: if the challenged restrictions reflected background 
principles of the state law of property and nuisance, a total loss of  
economically viable use would not be a regulatory taking.84 The Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence reflected, in Justice Kennedy’s 
words, a “central dynamic” of flexibility that was important to “recon-
cil[ing] two competing objectives” at play in regulatory takings cases: 
protection of individual property rights fundamental to an individual’s 
freedom and the government’s promotion of the public good through 
the adjusting of rights and interests.85  
The Court then turned to the question critical to determine whether 
a regulatory takings had occurred: “What [was] the proper unit of 
property against which to assess the effect of the challenged govern-
mental action?”86 If the choice of denominator was the portion of  
property that was affected, then “that portion is always taken in its 
entirety.”87 Justice Kennedy justified the need to avoid this circularity 
by distinguishing between a regulatory taking and a physical taking.88 
While a regulatory taking focuses on the impact of the challenged law 
on the value of the owner’s property, a physical taking examines the 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 82. Id. at 1942. 
 83. Id. at 1942–43 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  
 84. Id. at 1943. 
 85. Id. at 1937. 
 86. Id. at 1943.   
 87. Id. at 1944 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 
U.S. 602, 644 (1993)).  
 88. Id. at 1944.  
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normally evident effect of the physical invasion or appropriation.89 The 
Court then rejected two “unduly narrow” approaches to the property 
denominator.90 One would limit the denominator to that portion of 
property regulated by the law, which would “overstate the effect of the 
regulation” on the value of the property, turning even a delay into a 
total loss.91 The second would allow state law to control the choice,  
defining the relevant property coextensively with state laws delineat-
ing and affecting the property.92 Such an approach would give the  
states “unfettered authority to ‘shape . . . property rights and reason-
able investment-backed expectations’ ” and allow government to  
“fortify the state law against a takings claim.” 93  
To help answer the critical question, the majority opinion outlined 
a new set of factors that courts “must consider” in determining the  
denominator.94 The first factor concerned how land is handled under 
state and local laws, especially “how it is bounded or divided.”95 The 
reasonable expectations of a purchaser “must acknowledge legitimate 
restrictions affecting his or her subsequent use and dispensation of the 
property.”96 The timing of the enactment of a law would not be deter-
minative, though a preexisting restriction could shape an owner’s  
reasonable expectations.97 Significantly, “a use restriction which is 
triggered only after, or because of, a change in ownership should also 
guide a court’s assessment of reasonable private expectations.”98 As 
the dissent points out, this first factor appears to be blending—or per-
haps confusing—the question of whether a taking exists with the 
choice of denominator.99  
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lucas may have stimulated Justice  
Kennedy’s confusing analysis by tying the choice of denominator to the 
degree to which the reasonable expectations of the property owner 
have been shaped by state law. There Justice Scalia mentioned in a 
footnote that the choice of denominator “may lie in how the owner’s 
reasonable expectations have been shaped by . . . whether and to what 
degree the [s]tate’s law has accorded legal recognition and protection 
to the particular interest in land” claimed to have been taken by  
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 1944–45 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001)).  
 94. See id. at 1945. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 1950, 55–56 (Robert, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority approach 
confuses the “traditional touchstone for spotting a taking” with “defining private property”).   
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the diminution in value.100 Justice Scalia’s remarks focused on how 
state law recognizes and defines the property interest, not on how  
restrictions on use may affect the exercise of the interest. In Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, for example, Pennsylvania law had long  
recognized the mineral estate as a separate estate in land.101 In Murr, 
however, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the first factor, treatment 
under state law, appears to expand the analysis to include how the use 
restriction being challenged shapes an owner’s reasonable expecta-
tions for purposes of determining the denominator. Though the  
economic impact of the restriction should be considered in conducting 
regulatory takings analysis, Justice Kennedy brought the discussion 
of economic impact into the determination of the denominator before 
the Court considered whether a regulatory taking existed. Yet, in 
choosing the property benchmark in Murr, a court should focus on 
whether state law typically treats two substandard, contiguous lots as 
one or instead as separate tracts. 
The second factor focused on the physical characteristics of the 
land.102 The tract’s topography, physical relationship with other tracts, 
and the surrounding environment all would be relevant considera-
tions.103 For example, a court could consider whether the property is 
“an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmen-
tal or other regulation.”104 As support, Justice Kennedy quoted from 
his concurring opinion in Lucas where he noted: “Coastal property may 
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State 
can go further in regulating its development and use than the common 
law of nuisance might otherwise permit.”105  
The third factor involved assessing the value of the property  
affected by the regulation, “with special attention to the effect of  
burdened land on the value of other holdings.”106 Diminution in value 
of the regulated land, for example, could be “tempered if the regulated 
land adds value to the remaining property.”107 Added value could result 
from greater recreational space, increased privacy, or preserved natu-
ral spaces.108  The “absence of a special relationship” between the  
different tracts, however, would weigh against viewing the tracts as 
 
 100. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
 101. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).  
 102. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1945–46.  
 105. Id. at 1946 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  
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one, indicating a possible taking.109 A special relationship could exist, 
though, if a restriction on one tract protects or enhances use of the 
other tract.110 
After setting forth its new three-factor test for determining the  
denominator, the Court explained why it was rejecting the suggested 
approaches of both the government and the property owners. “Neither 
proposal . . . capture[s] the central legal and factual principles that 
inform reasonable expectations about property interests.”111 The  
government’s approach would link the choice of denominator to state 
law in a way that allows the government to avoid having to justify a 
regulation in light of its impact on the legitimate expectations of  
property owners.112  Though state law is an important consideration, 
courts must consider whether the regulation is consistent “with other 
indicia of reasonable expectations about property.”113 The approach of 
the property owners, on the other hand, would have had the Court  
presume that lot lines or boundaries define the relevant parcel.114  
Noting that lot lines are also “creatures of state law,” the Court re-
jected the petitioners’ idea of choosing state law principles that favor 
their position while ignoring other legal principles.115 Those overlooked 
principles included the merger provision, which was adopted as part 
of a regulatory scheme to allow development in areas protected under 
wild and scenic river legislation while preserving open space.116 Local 
building lot laws set minimum lot sizes for development and then use 
the merger concept to decrease the number of non-conforming lots 
when adjacent substandard lots come under common ownership.117 
“The merger provision . . . balanc[es] the legitimate goals of regulation 
with the reasonable expectations of landowners.”118 Treating lot lines 
as determinative would incentivize landowners expecting future  
regulation to adjust their boundaries and engage in manipulation or 
“gamesmanship.”119 
The Court then applied its new multi-factor test for the property 
benchmark and concluded that the two adjacent lots should be viewed 
as one parcel.120 The majority explained that state and local law  
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1946–47.  
 114. Id. at 1947.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1940, 1947. 
 117. See id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1948.  
 120. Id. 
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supported this conclusion because the merger provision kicked in after 
the petitioners voluntarily became owners of both lots and reflected 
“the widespread understanding that lot lines are not dominant or  
controlling in every case.”121 The merger of two substandard, adjacent 
lots applied after the lots were acquired by the same owner and bal-
anced the public interest in developable lots and the landowners’  
interests, thus shaping the owners’ reasonable expectations.122 The 
physical characteristics of the lots also supported the Court’s decision 
to treat them as one. Their adjacency, rough terrain and narrow shape, 
and location next to a river designated as wild and scenic all indicated 
that use of the lots would be limited.123 Finally, the prospective value 
from using the two lots as an integrated whole exceeded the aggregate 
value of each of the lots used separately, suggesting a “complementa-
rity” between the two.124  
Viewing the property as a whole, the Court concluded that econom-
ically viable use existed and therefore no total Lucas taking had  
occurred.125 Nor could the Court find a partial regulatory taking under 
the Penn Central test.126 The economic impact was not severe enough, 
and the petitioners’ reasonable expectations did not include the expec-
tation of selling or developing substandard lots that had come under 
common ownership.127 Finally, the merger provision was part of a  
reasonable land use regulatory scheme shaping the expectations of the 
property owners.128 
Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito in dissent, Chief Justice  
Roberts initially admitted that the majority’s “bottom-line conclusion 
does not trouble [him],” stating, “the majority presents a fair case that 
the Murrs can still make good use of both lots and that the ordinance 
is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas.”129 He disagreed, how-
ever, with the “elaborate” test used by the majority, preferring instead 
to follow the traditional approach to defining property rights. 130  Under 
that approach, “[s]tate law defines the boundaries of distinct parcels 
of land, and those boundaries should determine the ‘private property’ 
at issue in regulatory takings cases.”131 The Takings Clause, in other 
 
 121. See id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1949. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1949–50.  
 129. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
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words, protects property rights as “established” by state law.132 
Whether a regulatory taking exists is a question distinct from the 
choice of the property benchmark.133 Resolving that overriding takings 
question can involve other considerations like the adjacency and com-
mon ownership of two lots—considerations that the majority swept up 
in its new factor approach to identifying the property denominator.134  
In introducing the Court’s basic principles of regulatory takings, 
Chief Justice Roberts accepted the logic of regulatory takings as laid 
out by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.135 That logic 
stressed that, though regulatory takings are more indirect than  
physical takings, the Court must also protect private property against  
regulation that goes too far.136 Otherwise the “natural tendency of  
human nature” would take over, extending regulation “until at last 
private property disappears.”137 The Chief Justice also accepted that 
regulatory takings are not generally defined by per se rules, though  
“a few fixed principles” do exist.138 One of those principles is that  
regulatory takings analysis “must be conducted with respect to specific 
property.”139 A second provides that a regulation denying all economi-
cally viable use constitutes a taking.140 Other than these fixed rules, 
the regulatory takings doctrine uses a more flexible approach to deter-
mine whether the government regulation forces an owner “to bear  
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”141  
Recognizing that a narrow approach to defining the relevant prop-
erty would “threaten[] the careful balance between property rights and 
government authority” struck by the Court’s regulatory takings  
doctrine, the Chief Justice reaffirmed the “as a whole” test for identi-
fying the denominator.142 Under state law the whole of a tract of land 
generally was defined by the boundaries of the tract absent “the most 
exceptional circumstances.”143 He explained that property rights exist 
 
 132. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 1951. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1951 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 140. See id. at 1951–52.  
 141. Id. at 1952 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 1953.  
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in a particular thing—here a tract of land that is “horizontally 
bounded;” that “thing[]” should not vary according to the purpose or 
issue.144 By looking to state law to define the boundaries of the whole, 
his approach removed the “risk of strategic unbundling,” preventing 
an owner from successfully claiming a single strand has been taken.145 
An inquiry into the reasonableness of the owners’ expectations 
about developing each lot was not, in the Chief Justice’s view, an  
appropriate part of defining the relevant parcel.146 Rather those expec-
tations, as well as other factors identified by the majority’s new test, 
related to the question of whether a regulatory taking of the relevant 
parcel had occurred.147 Otherwise “the effectiveness of the Takings 
Clause as a check on the government’s power to shift the cost[s] of  
public life onto private [property]” would be undermined.148 According 
to Chief Justice Roberts, the majority approach allows greater consid-
eration of government interests by shifting the definition of the  
relevant property from state law considerations to the reasonableness 
of the government’s regulatory interests.149  
Though many hoped that the Court in Murr would settle the de-
nominator question definitively and satisfactorily, the opinions of  
Justices Kennedy and Roberts fail to achieve those results.150 The  
majority opinion continues the trend of mixing substantive due process 
and takings analysis,151 and, in the process, heightens the federalism 
dimension of constitutional property.152 At one point in his opinion, 
Justice Kennedy affirmatively states that the Court’s case law “recog-
nizes that reasonable land-use regulations do not work a taking.”153  
He then points as support to the Court’s decision in Agins v. City of 
 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 1953–54.  
 146. Id. at 1952–53. 
 147. Id. at 1954.  
 148. Id.  
 149. See id. at 1955.  
 150. Indeed, reform legislation has already been enacted in at least one jurisdiction to 
ban use of a common land use tool—the merger doctrine—for contiguous lots owned by one 
party without permission. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 711, 722 
(2010) (remitting the determination of relevant parcel to the trial court, due to the fact-in-
tensive nature of the inquiry); Michael M. Berger, Ruminations on Takings Law in Honor of 
David Callies, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 17, 28–29 (2018); James W. Ely, Jr., 
Governmental Forbearance: Myth or Reality?, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 125, 
125 (2014).   
 151. Accord Brady, supra note 8 (arguing that Murr’s new three-factor test is problem-
atic, complicating takings analysis and ruining constitutional property federalism, and will 
inevitably lead to inconsistent outcomes). 
 152. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurispru-
dence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004) (discussing how takings jurisprudence is shaped by 
federalism concerns).  
 153. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.  
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Tiburon, describing Agins as upholding zoning regulations against a 
takings challenge “as a legitimate exercise of the government’s police 
power.”154 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a later case, Lingle v. 
Chevron, limited Agins—because of Agins’s use of a “substantially  
advance” test—to ensure that a heightened review standard was not 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of laws.155 He, however, stressed  
that Agins survived the Lingle decision even though the Agins test was 
“imprecise.”156 Then, in applying its multi-factor denominator test to 
identify the property benchmark, he speaks in terms of the central 
“purposes of this takings inquiry” and the legitimacy of treating  
the lots as one parcel under the merger doctrine.157 As Chief Justice 
Roberts observed, the majority shifts the definition of the relevant 
property interest from state law considerations to the legitimacy of 
government interests.158  
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, allows state law to con-
trol the choice of denominator and, therefore, in many situations,  
resolution of the takings inquiry.159 Using only the state’s approach  
to defining boundaries, however, would ignore the fact that lot or 
boundary lines generally were drawn before development plans or  
subdivisions were made. Those boundaries typically do not reflect the 
suitability of the tract or lot for development. The lot lines were estab-
lished under state law for the purpose of determining ownership, not 
for the purpose of evaluating the development potential of the lot.  
The mixing of substantive due process and takings analysis and  
the evolution of regulatory takings from physical takings have led to 
the untethering of a number of legal concepts that defined and limited 
takings analysis. Those concepts involved notions of unjust enrich-
ment, foreseeability, and windfalls that were tied to the in rem nature 
of the Takings Clause, captured through the use of the term “prop-
erty.” The next section discusses the evolutionary path from physical 
to regulatory takings and the legal concepts that have gotten lost in 
the translation.  
 
 154. Id. (discussing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).   
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 545–48 (2005)). In Agins the Court 
held there was no taking when a zoning ordinance limited, without completely eliminating, 
development on the land. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262–63. In Lingle the Court narrowed Agins, 
holding that the validity of a law under a substantially advances formula was a matter of 
due process and did not address whether a compensable taking existed. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 
548. 
 157. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950.  
 158. Id. at 1955–56.  
 159. Id. at 1954.  
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III.   THE ROAD FROM PHYSICAL TO  
REGULATORY TAKINGS  
Even before Mahon established a constitutional basis for declaring 
as confiscatory laws that went too far in restricting economic use, the 
courts had mixed the language of confiscation and takings with due 
process deprivations. This mixed narrative is understandable when 
considered in light of the early practice of handling federal takings 
claims brought against states under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as part of the first principles of universal  
law captured in that Clause.160 Early on, the Court construed the Due 
Process Clause as including a compensation requirement, “founded in 
natural equity,” for the taking of property.161 Claims of uncompensated 
takings initially required a physical occupation or invasion to be  
successful.162 As the degree of permanence, directness, and physicality 
of the interference declined, courts would also consider the impact of 
the government act on use value, the foreseeability of the impact, and 
its substantiality.163 Ultimately, as the scope of government regula-
tions grew, courts became concerned about the seemingly limitless 
reach of government regulation over property and decided to recognize 
the concept of a regulatory taking. The separation of the regulatory 
takings concept from physical takings enabled courts to find a taking 
when no government-induced physical occupation or appropriation  
existed. The separation also allowed the courts to break from the  
deferential substantive due process review accorded legislative acts  
affecting property and impose more limits on government regulation 
of property. 
A.   Police Power Regulation of  
“Property Clothed with a Public Interest” 
The Court’s oversight of economic regulation of property has gone 
through a number of phases. When the young country needed more 
settlement and westward expansion, land distribution laws played a 
major role in promoting and regulating growth, agricultural produc-
tion, and economic development.164 Government’s authority to promote 
the public good—the public health, welfare, and safety—was broad. 
 
 160. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897); see 
also Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our “Regulatory Takings” Jurisprudence: The Myth 
and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L. 
J. 613, 667–68 (1996). 
 161. Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 236. 
 162. See Butler, Governance Function, supra note 2, at 1689-90, 1721–23.  
 163. See id. at 1709–16, 1721–23.  
 164. See, e.g., LYNDA L. BUTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL 
LAW ch. 8 (Michie Co. 1988) (discussing Virginia’s land distribution laws). 
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The Court recognized that each citizen “necessarily parts with some 
rights or privileges” in order to enable the government to adopt laws 
to further the public good.165 Further, this power included regulation 
of the manner in which owners used their property and could abate 
harmful or noxious uses.166 But the Court recognized that there are 
“limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.”167 If a statute 
had “no real or substantial relation” to the public health, welfare, or 
safety or was “a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamen-
tal law,” then the statute had exceeded those limits.168 At the time, the 
key constraints imposed on the states’ police power regulation of prop-
erty were the Due Process and Contracts Clauses.169 
This approach to police power regulation became problematic once 
the Court broadened the scope of the police power through its property 
“affected with a public interest” doctrine.170 Formulated in the 1876 
decision Munn v. Illinois,171 the doctrine justified regulation of certain 
 
 165. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876); see also ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE 
POWER § 16, at 12 (1904) (noting that sometimes individual interests must yield to the public 
welfare). 
 166. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658, 663–64 (1887); Munn, 94 U.S. at 125; see also 
FREUND, supra note 165, §§ 511–517 (discussing the difference between valid police power 
regulation and eminent domain). The 1887 decision Mugler v. Kansas reflects the early ap-
proach of the Supreme Court to police power regulation. In Mugler, the Court concluded that 
government’s lawful exercise of its police power to prevent a public nuisance caused by pri-
vate property was not subject to the just compensation principle even though the government 
action destroyed or significantly diminished the value of the property. The power to prohibit 
harmful uses was not subject to the condition that government pay just compensation for 
pecuniary losses suffered by property owners because, according to the Court, property own-
ers were not permitted to conduct a noxious use. In Mugler, the state legislature had enacted 
a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors except for medical, 
scientific, and mechanical purposes. Prior to the adoption of the law, Mugler had built and 
operated a brewery. Enforcement of the statutory prohibition meant a material diminution 
in value of the property. When Mugler was arrested for violating the ban on the sale and 
manufacture of intoxicating liquors and for maintaining a public nuisance, he challenged the 
law on due process grounds, arguing that the law had in effect taken his property without 
payment of just compensation by materially diminishing its value and thus had deprived 
him of due process. In explaining why no constitutional violation had occurred, the Court 
declared that a state’s police power included the power to prohibit uses injurious to the pub-
lic. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664–65, 668–69, 671. 
 167. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2016); 
see also GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
THE REGULATORY STATE’S ACQUISITION, USE, AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 20–26 
(1998).  
 170. See generally FREUND, supra note 165, §§ 372–401; William M. Treanor, Jam for 
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L .J. 813, 836 (1998). For a 
discussion of the origins of the doctrine, see Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent 
Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. AM. HIST. 329 (1971). 
For a different perspective, see CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE 
OF THE TRACKS (1986) (exploring use of a common law duty to serve in addressing problems 
of inequality in providing essential services to the public). 
 171. 94 U.S. 113, 113 (1876). 
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property to protect the public interest. In Munn the Court upheld the 
regulation of rates charged by grain elevator operators against a due 
process challenge.172 The case involved a state law regulating elevators 
or warehouses when grain was stored in bulk and the grain of different 
owners was mixed or otherwise stored in a manner that made preser-
vation of the separately owned lots impossible.173 Among other require-
ments, the law mandated that the owner, lessee, or manager of the 
warehouse obtain a license to operate as a public warehouse, file a 
bond, and charge no more than the maximum rate allowed by law.174 
In analyzing the validity of the government’s regulation of privately 
owned elevators and warehouses, the Court declared that an owner 
who devotes his property to a use affecting the public is “in effect, 
grant[ing] to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to  
be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the 
interest he has thus created.”175 The Court explained that property  
becomes “clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to 
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.”176 
Businesses that have monopoly power over a product or use impacting 
the public welfare would qualify as such property.177 The grain ware-
housemen fell into this category because of the immenseness of their 
grain market, the absence of public grain warehouses, and the great 
demand for grain.178 In the words of counsel quoted by the Court, the 
warehousemen stood at the “gateway of commerce.”179 
An important factor in Munn and other early property affected with 
a public interest cases was the monopolistic character of the business. 
In some of these cases, the monopoly arose from natural conditions. In 
other cases, economic conditions tended to create the monopoly.180  
Regardless of the origin, the monopolistic conditions meant that  
“the common regulating factor, competition . . . [was] absent”181 and 
therefore would not limit the profits of the business. Further, the  
importance of the business to the public meant that the business  
would be able to exploit its monopoly power in the absence of rate 
 
 172. Id. at 135–36.  
 173. See id. at 115–16. 
 174. See id. at 116–17. 
 175. Id. at 126. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 127–28. The Court ultimately decided that the existence of monopoly 
power is not a necessary condition. See FREUND, supra note 165, §§ 376–377 (discussing the 
role of the monopoly factor).  
 178. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 130. 
 179. Id. at 132 (quoting counsel) (internal quotation marks omitted); see HAAR & 
FESSLER, supra note 170, at 146–47 (discussing Munn).  
 180. See FREUND, supra note 165, § 377, at 387–88. 
 181. Id. at 387. 
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regulation.182 Although later cases clarified that monopoly power was 
not a necessary condition, it still helped to identify situations where 
the public could be subject to “exorbitant charges and arbitrary con-
trol.”183 
The Supreme Court case law defining “property affected with a pub-
lic interest” failed to provide a consistent or coherent definition.184 
Among other problems, the case law did not identify a common, defin-
ing characteristic capable of explaining, in a predictable and principled 
manner, when property was affected with a public interest.185 Some 
justices preferred to limit the category of property affected with a  
public interest to property that was dedicated by the owner to public 
use or for which the government granted a special privilege or use.186 
Others included a wide range of businesses within the category.187 
Though the courts disagreed about the scope of property affected  
with a public interest, courts generally agreed that rate regulation  
of businesses affected with a public interest was allowed, even without 
a showing of an actual threat posed by high rates, as long as the regu-
lation did not deny a reasonable or fair rate of return.188 
Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of property affected 
with a public interest was announced by the Court in Charles Wolff 
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations.189 According to that  
decision, three general classes of property affected with a public inter-
est existed. One category included businesses “carried on under the 
authority of a public grant of privileges” that expressly or impliedly 
imposed an “affirmative duty” to perform a public service.190  
Businesses falling within the first category were “created for public  
purposes.”191 Examples included public utilities, railroads, and other 
common carriers.192 A second category involved certain “exceptional” 
businesses to which the public interest had attached.193 Inns, ferries, 
 
 182. See generally id. §§ 376–377, at 385–88 (discussing the monopoly factor). 
 183. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 538 (1923); 
see FREUND, supra note 165, § 376, at 386. 
 184. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 145–54 (discussing how the concept dif-
fered among courts and changed over time).  
 185. See FREUND, supra note 165, § 373, at 382; HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 
145–51 (discussing “clothed with a public interest” as an “expanding conception of a public 
utility”).  
 186. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136, 139 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 187. See, e.g., Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535–36. 
 188. See Treanor, supra note 170, at 838–39. 
 189. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 153–54 
(discussing Wolff Packing).  
 190. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535. 
 191. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898). 
 192. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535. 
 193. Id. 
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cabs, and grist mills seemed to fall within this category.194 The third 
category involved businesses that were “not public at their inception” 
but had “risen to be such” status because the owner had devoted  
his business to the public use.195 Such a change in status required 
“more than that the public welfare [was] affected by continuity or by 
the price at which a commodity is sold or a service rendered.”196 Rather 
the circumstances must indicate that “a peculiarly close relation”  
existed between the public and the business—a relation that suggests 
the existence of “an affirmative obligation . . . to be reasonable in deal-
ing with the public.”197 The key characteristics of businesses in the 
third category were “the indispensable nature of the service” and  
the potential exploitation of a dependent public by exorbitant prices 
and arbitrary control.198 Examples of businesses in the third category 
included grain elevators,199 fire insurance,200 water works,201 and tele-
graph and telephone companies.202 Judicial use of the “property af-
fected with a public interest” doctrine probably reached its peak under 
Wolff Packing.  
B.   The Rise of Substantive Due Process Constraints and  
Development of Takings Theories 
The property affected with a public interest doctrine lost its domi-
nance in the 1890s as jurists and commentators concerned about the 
breadth of the holding in Munn and of police power regulation more 
generally searched for theories to limit the reach of the police power.203 
One result of this search was the transformation of the due process 
principle into substantive protection of property.204 For a time the  
Due Process Clause became a powerful substantive check on economic 
regulation of property.205 Another result was the application of a just 
compensation principle, based on Fourteenth Amendment due process 
 
 194. See id.; Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 255 (1916). 
 195. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 535. 
 196. Id. at 536. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 538. 
 199. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 114 (1876). 
 200. German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 405–15 (1914). 
 201. See Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 348 (1884). 
 202. See Hockett v. State, 5 N.E. 178, 182 (Ind. 1886).  
 203. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry Co. v. Minn., 134 U.S. 418, 456–57 (1890) (hold-
ing that the railroad was deprived of its property without due process when the railroad 
commission set prices that were not subject to judicial review); SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 
26. 
 204. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry Co., 134 U.S. at 456–57; SKOURAS, supra note 
169, at 26. 
 205. See SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 129 n.52; ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISES 
AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BENCH AND BAR 1887–1895, at 2 (1960). 
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analysis, to limit the regulation of property affected with a public  
interest. In its 1898 decision Smyth v. Ames, the Court clarified that 
the regulation of rates charged by a business affected with a public 
interest must allow a fair or reasonable rate of return.206 A rate regu-
lation that denied a fair return would deprive the property owner of 
due process and equal protection of the law contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment and therefore require payment of just compensation.207 
Smyth thus imposed some limits on the property affected with a public 
interest doctrine, providing a fair or reasonable return test for distin-
guishing between legitimate and confiscatory rate regulations.208 
Reaction to Munn’s broad approach to interpreting property  
affected with a public interest helped to set the stage for the develop-
ment of the regulatory takings doctrine.209 As discontent with govern-
ment regulation of property grew, the influence of jurists and commen-
tators supporting stronger protection of contract and property rights 
increased.210 The emergence of substantive due process provided some 
fairly immediate but relatively short-lived relief from government  
regulation of property.211 By the late 1930s, substantive protection of 
property under the due process clause had run its course.212 The fair or 
reasonable return limitation on police power regulation of property  
affected with a public interest proved more durable. It provided a  
foundation for the regulatory takings doctrine, establishing that  
deprivation of a fair return on property affected with a public interest 
could, by itself, be a constitutional violation requiring just compensa-
tion. Expansion of this principle beyond the context of property  
affected with a public interest required, however, that the courts  
overcome the conceptual constraints of traditional takings law. Those 
constraints, which arose from the early focus on physical takings,  
concerned how the courts defined not only the scope of takings liability 
but also the types of recoverable damages through the consequential 
loss doctrine.  
 
 206. See 169 U.S. 466, 546–47 (1898). But see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline 
Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599, 601–06 (1942) (Black, J., concurring) (explaining the havoc caused by 
the Smyth decision and how the Court has subsequently limited Smyth to clarify the differ-
ence between the power of eminent domain and rate regulation).  
 207. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 525–27, 546; Treanor, supra note 170, at 837–38. 
 208. See Treanor, supra note 170, at 837–38; Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory “Takings”: 
The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitu-
tional Law, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10369 (Sept. 1987), reprinted in 1988 ZONING AND PLANNING 
LAW HANDBOOK 337, 344, 352 (1988). 
 209. See Treanor, supra note 170, at 836–39, 861–71 (discussing the transition from 
property affected with a public interest to a takings revival).  
 210. See HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 170, at 152.  
 211. See JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON 
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 2.03 (3d ed. 2019). 
 212. See DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 50–54 
(1992). 
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Until the regulatory takings concept emerged, property owners 
seeking just compensation under the Takings Clause had to establish 
an actual physical invasion, occupation, or appropriation of property 
directly caused by government.213 Even when a court occasionally 
voiced concerns about the economic impact of regulatory interference, 
the courts generally refused to find a taking based on regulatory  
interference alone as long as substantial enjoyment or profitable use 
remained.214 The courts stressed that diminution in value or pecuniary 
loss resulting solely from regulatory interference was incidental to the 
proper exercise of government power and therefore not recoverable  
under the Takings Clause.215 Lawful police power action thus could not 
result in a taking absent a physical invasion or direct appropriation of 
a property interest.  
A core part of the Court’s justification for denying compensation for 
diminution in value resulting from regulatory interference was the 
common law consequential damages or loss doctrine.216 Based on the 
distinction between general and consequential damages, this doctrine 
varies in meaning and scope according to the legal context. The basic 
idea of the doctrine is that recovery of damages generally is limited to 
injury that arises naturally as a direct result of wrongful action.217 
Consequential or special damage instead refers to loss that occurs 
more indirectly as a consequence of injury to plaintiff’s property or  
asset.218 Consequential damage can include lost profits or income,  
out-of-pocket expenses incurred to deal with the loss of the property, 
diminution in value of the remaining property caused by the use  
of adjacent property, and emotional distress and other personal,  
nonmonetary losses resulting from the tort, breach of contract, or  
taking.219 General damage, in contrast, measures the diminution in  
the owner’s net worth caused by the loss of the actual asset.220 In a 
takings situation, government must pay just compensation for the 
value of the taken property typically measured as the difference  
 
 213. Butler, Governance Function, supra note 2, at 1689–90, 1721–23.  
 214. See supra notes 23–38 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Transp. Co. v. Chi., 99 U.S. 635, 637 (1878); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870); 
FREUND, supra note 165, § 509, at 544; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 71–73 (1992). 
 216. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946); FREUND, supra 
note 165, § 509. 
 217. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1011 (1964 & Supp. 1999); 1 
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 111–13 (8th ed. 1891). 
 218. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.2, at 289, § 3.3(1), at 293 (2d ed. 1993) 
[hereinafter DOBBS, REMEDIES]. 
 219. See generally id. § 3.3 (1), (4), § 5.15(1); LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D].  
 220. In contracts and torts actions, courts measure general damages as the difference 
between the market value of the property before and after the tort or breach as of a particular 
time. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 3.3(3), (4). 
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between the fair market value of the entire property before the taking 
and the remaining portion after the taking.221 The differences between 
general and consequential damages thus center on what is being  
compensated. General damages compensate for the loss of or injury to 
the actual asset, while consequential damages involve losses occurring 
because the injured asset can no longer produce income or avoid 
losses.222 
In the physical takings context, consequential loss arises when a 
property owner incurs damage in addition to the actual loss of the 
property resulting from the forced transfer or physical invasion of the 
property by government. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has 
strictly adhered to the consequential loss doctrine in physical takings 
cases, denying just compensation for damages not directly related to 
the property that is taken.223 Just compensation cases have invoked 
the doctrine on two levels: first, in defining the scope of takings liabil-
ity and, second, in measuring just compensation.224 In the Legal  
Tender Cases, the Court explained the role of the doctrine in defining 
the scope of the Takings Clause, noting that the Clause “has always 
been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to 
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.”225 
The Clause “has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to 
inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.”226  
As examples, the Court pointed to a “new tariff, an embargo, a draft, 
or a war [which] may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; 
may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless;”227 yet surely 
no one expected that these exercises of lawful power would be barred 
or inhibited by the Takings Clause.228 More than one hundred years 
later, the Supreme Court commented on the role of the doctrine in 
measuring just compensation. The Court noted that just compensation 
normally is measured by the fair market value of the appropriated 
property and that fair market value does not include consequential 
damages.229 
 
 221. See LAITOS supra note 211, § 18.03[C], at 18–22 to 18–24.  
 222. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 3.3(4), at 304. 
 223. See United States. v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984); United States v. 
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946); Transp. Co. v. Chi., 99 U.S. 635, 641–42 (1878); 
2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.08[2] (rev’d 3d ed. 2000). See generally JACQUES B. 
GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.4(B) (1982); LAITOS, 
supra note 211, § 17.03 (discussing general principles and issues relating to the calculation 
of just compensation).  
 224. See generally SEDGWICK, supra note 217, § 114. 
 225. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See United States. v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984). 
2020] MURR AND REGULATORY TAKINGS  
 
129
The origin of the consequential loss doctrine is far from clear.  
Morton Horwitz, in his influential work The Transformation of  
American Law, 1780–1860, attributed the initial development of the 
doctrine to “the need to reduce the burden of damage judgments and 
to make economic planning more coherent.”230 He explained that the 
courts began by “redefin[ing] the scope of legal injury”231 to exclude 
certain injuries because they either were trivial or already included  
in the compensation paid.232 Further, regardless of the legal context, 
courts traditionally have been suspicious of consequential loss  
claims. Early on, American courts accepted the principles set forth  
in Hadley v. Baxendale233 in defining recoverable breach of contract 
damages.234 Those principles include the notion that the injured party 
may recover for all general damages “as may fairly and reasonably be 
considered . . . arising naturally . . . according to the usual course of 
things” from the breach of contract.235 Although Hadley also allowed 
recovery of special or consequential damage, such recovery could only 
occur when it could “reasonably be supposed to have been in the  
contemplation of both parties . . . as the probable result of the breach” 
and the damage was reasonably certain.236 In tort actions the courts 
similarly restricted recovery of special damages to those that proxi-
mately resulted from the wrongdoer’s act. Those damages that fail the 
proximity test were viewed as too remote to be recoverable.237 
In the common law and constitutional property contexts, traditional 
courts took an even stronger position. The courts precluded, for  
example, recovery for indirect injuries to land resulting from action 
taken on neighboring land when the actor committed no trespass or 
physical invasion. As early as 1815, the Massachusetts Supreme  
Court announced that a landowner who “does what he has a right  
to do upon his own land, without trespassing upon any law, custom, 
 
 230. HORWITZ, supra note 215, at 71. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See, e.g., Steele v. W. Inland Lock Navigation Co., 2 Johns. 283, 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1807) (holding that there is no recovery for damages that must have been taken into consid-
eration in awarding just compensation for the taking); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 
314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that there is no recovery for “trifling inconvenience or dam-
age to others”). 
 233. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
 234. The Uniform Commercial Code continues this approach in section 1–305. It provides 
that “neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically 
provided in [this Act] or by other rule of law.”  U.C.C. § 1–305; see also 2 DOBBS, REMEDIES, 
supra note 218, § 12.17(1). 
 235. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 547 (1998). 
 236. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 235, at 547, 553. 
 237. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 379, at 1056 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS, 
TORTS]; SEDGWICK, supra note 217, §§ 113, 142–143. 
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title, or possession,” is not liable for “injurious consequences,”238 “only 
for the natural and necessary consequences of his acti[ons].”239 The 
Massachusetts court explained that a landowner “ought to foresee  
the probable use” of the adjoining lands240 and “to have taken better 
care” of his property.241 By the early 1820s, state courts already were 
distinguishing between direct and consequential injuries in resolving 
takings claims.242 As economic activity increased in frequency and 
scope, judicial protection of businesses from liability for indirect  
injuries began to impact resolution of takings claims in federal courts. 
Eventually, courts used the consequential loss doctrine to justify  
liability exemptions in both the takings and the common law property 
contexts.243 Just as consequential injuries resulting from the exercise 
of a lawful private right were not part of the risk assumed by the right 
holder and were therefore not recoverable, consequential losses result-
ing from the exercise of lawful government action normally were not 
compensable.244 
The courts have offered a number of justifications for exempting 
consequential losses from the government’s takings liability. In one of 
the early state cases,245 the Massachusetts Supreme Court suggested 
several possible rationales: foreseeability, unjust enrichment, and a 
concern for windfalls.246 As the court explained, landowners should 
take into account the risk of consequential injury when they agree  
to a purchase price, especially when their land adjoins a public good 
like a road.247 As voluntary purchasers, landowners could choose either 
to “indemnify themselves in the price” or to take the risk of future  
improvements and injury.248 Landowners are “presumed to foresee the 
changes which public necessity [and] convenience may require,” and  
to “avoid or provide against a loss”249 Property owners who suffer  
consequential injuries should have known about the possibility of  
future development and “guarded against a future loss.”250 
 
 238. Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 226–27 (1815); accord Panton v. Holland, 17 
Johns. 92, 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (holding that a landowner is not liable for consequential 
damages caused to adjoining land absent negligence or maliciousness). 
 239. Thurston, 12 Mass. at 229. 
 240. Id. at 226. 
 241. Id. at 229. 
 242. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823). 
 243. See supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text. 
 244. See generally SEDGWICK, supra note 217, §§ 110–69 (discussing consequential dam-
ages). 
 245. See Callender, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418. 
 246. See id. at 431–32; see also Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 225, 228 (1815).  
 247. See Callender, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.)  at 431. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 432. 
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Compensation for consequential injuries thus could unjustly enrich 
landowners. Other courts have offered similar explanations. In a 1984 
decision, for example, the United States Supreme Court expressed the 
fear that compensation for consequential damages would result in a 
windfall if the damages were not used to rebuild or reacquire the lost 
asset.251 In deciding not to award compensation for harm from devel-
opment projects on adjacent property, the Court noted that the owner 
of the damaged property should have foreseen the future develop-
ment.252 
Other justifications for excluding consequential losses from com-
pensation awards exist. A New York state court, for instance, relied on 
the importance of the public interest to justify the doctrine. In Lansing 
v. Smith, the court explained that “every great public improvement 
must, almost of necessity, more or less affect individual convenience 
and property; and where the injury sustained is remote and conse-
quential, it is . . . to be borne as a part of the price to be paid for the 
advantages of the social condition.”253 Important public improvements 
would not take place if government had to compensate property  
owners for indirect or consequential losses.254 Additionally, courts have 
noted that consequential damages are too uncertain and subjective  
to be awarded.255 Focusing only on fair market value provides an  
objective way to measure just compensation: transferable value has 
built-in external validity checks.256 The textual language of the Just 
Compensation Clause also provides justification. As the Court ex-
plained in a 1946 decision, the Fifth Amendment compensates for  
the “value of the interest taken. . . . [Therefore] evidence of loss of  
profits, damage to good will, the expense of relocation and other such 
consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation proceed-
ings.”257 Because of the Clause’s reference to the property taken, courts 
have stressed the in rem nature of the just compensation principle, 
noting that the Clause protects the taking of property and not the  
 
 
 251. See United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1984). 
 252. See Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924); see also GELIN & MILLER, supra 
note 223, § 2.4, at 71–72. 
 253. 8 Cow. 146, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828). 
 254. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 476 
(5th ed. 1998); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 223, § 6.08[2], at 6–131 to -132. 
 255. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946); see also GELIN 
& MILLER, supra note 223, § 2.4, at 84–85. 
 256. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). 
 257. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377–78. 
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personal interests of the owner.258 In its 1893 decision Monongahela 
Navigation Co. v. United States, the Court explained the in rem nature 
of takings protection: 
And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, 
and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment 
is personal. . . . Instead of continuing that form of statement . . . the 
personal element is left out, and the “just compensation” is to be a 
full equivalent of the property taken.259 
Whether a type of consequential loss is recoverable thus depends in 
part on the legal context of the case. While the courts in tort and 
breach of contract actions might compensate for consequential damage 
that meets the foreseeability or proximate cause tests, courts in tak-
ings actions traditionally did not allow recovery of consequential 
losses.260 The courts regularly have rejected takings claims for diminu-
tion in value of remaining land when the diminution in value is caused 
by the use of adjacent land.261 The courts also do not allow recovery of 
lost profits in takings actions, reasoning that the government did not 
actually take the business producing the income.262 Nor do the courts 
 
 258. The precise meaning of the consequential loss concept has varied according to the 
legal and factual context and according to the type of consequential injury involved in a case. 
Consequential loss cases typically involve one of three key legal contexts: breach of contract, 
torts, and takings. In a breach of contract action, courts allow recovery of consequential dam-
age that should have been foreseeable or reasonably anticipated by the parties as a probable 
result of the breach and that can be established with reasonable certainty as resulting from 
the defendant’s breach. DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 12.4(4)–(7); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 912 (2d ed. 1990). In a tort action, a plaintiff must 
establish that the consequential damage was the proximate and natural result of the wrong-
doer’s act or failure to act. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, § 3.4; SEDGWICK, supra 
note 217, §§ 110–13, 142–43. If consequential damages are so unusual or unforeseeable that 
no one could have reasonably anticipated them, they are not recoverable. See DOBBS, TORTS, 
supra note 237, § 379, at 1056; SEDGWICK, supra note 217, § 142, at 201. Finally, in takings 
actions courts generally conclude that “non-physical damage . . . suffered by a property which 
is neither invaded nor appropriated” is nonrecoverable consequential damage. NICHOLS, su-
pra note 223, § 6.08[2], at 6–121. Different types of consequential loss include the diminution 
in value of the remaining portion of the owner’s property caused by use of adjacent land, loss 
of profits or business opportunities, additional expenses incurred to deal with the aftermath 
of the breach, tort, or taking, and personal, nonmonetary injuries indirectly resulting from 
the wrong. See GELIN & MILLER, supra note 223, § 2.4. 
 259. 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893); see also GELIN & MILLER, supra note 223, § 2.4, at 79. 
 260. See Monongahela Navigation, 148 U.S. at 326; DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 218, 
§ 3.4, at 318; GELIN & MILLER, supra note 223 at 78–79; LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D]. 
 261. In Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 372 (1924), for example, the Court held 
that the owner of land taken for the construction of a nitrate plant was not entitled to com-
pensation for diminution in value of the portion of the owner’s land not taken because the 
diminution was caused by the acquisition and use of adjacent lands owned by others for the 
same project.  
 262. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925); Omnia Co. v. United 
States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923). Voters in some states have approved state constitutional provi-
sions that expand the measure of just compensation to include some consequential losses. 
See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.  
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allow recovery of out-of-pocket expenses incurred to deal with the loss 
of the taken property.263 According to one scholar, the courts reason 
that such expenses would not be recoverable in actions involving  
voluntary sales and therefore should not be compensable in takings 
situations.264 Finally, courts generally do not award compensation for  
emotional distress and other personal, nonmonetary damages relating 
to the taking. Otherwise government would be discouraged from  
taking any land for beneficial purposes.265  
Eventually, as physical takings analysis brought in regulatory as-
pects, the courts introduced several theories and principles of liability 
that would become important to modern takings analysis. One theory 
involved an extension of the functional equivalence concept seen in 
some traditional physical takings cases. As Justice Holmes explained 
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, depriving regulated property of com-
mercially viable use “has very nearly the same effect for constitutional 
purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”266 Another theory ad-
vanced in Mahon focused on the limited public interest furthered by 
the statute. Though Justice Holmes admitted that “there is a public 
interest even in this” case of the purchase of a single private house, he 
stressed that the public interest in ordinary private affairs usually 
does not warrant much government interference.267 In Mahon, the 
harm to the private house was “not common or public.”268 Nor did it 
raise a public safety issue; notice of the impeding subsidence had been 
given to the surface property owner.269 Under Holmesian analysis, the 
public interest thus was relegated to a threshold inquiry into the basic 
legitimacy of the legislative act but was not relevant to evaluating the 
economic impact of the act on the property owner. A third theory in-
volved the concept of average reciprocity of advantage. As Justice 
Holmes explained, the statute did not secure the “average reciprocity 
of advantage” needed to justify police power regulation of property.270 
According to the majority opinion, the regulated property owner in Ma-
hon did not receive benefits as well as burdens from the act.271 A 
 
 263. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 338–39 (1893). 
 264. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 55 (1985). 
 265. See LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D]. 
 266. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
 267. Id. at 413. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. at 414. 
 270. Id. at 415–16.  
 271. See id. at 414–15. But see id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (declaring that reci-
procity of advantage is not a consideration when the purpose of police power regulation is to 
prevent public harm from private land use). Some have interpreted the average reciprocity 
of advantage test narrowly to require tangible benefits for the regulated property owner. 
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“strong public desire to improve the public condition” was not enough, 
in Justice Holmes’s opinion, to justify taking property without pay-
ment of just compensation when no average reciprocity of advantage 
existed.272 A fourth justification for the decision was assumption of 
risk. Holmes explained that when parties voluntarily “take the risk of 
acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their 
risk has become a danger warrants . . . giving . . . them greater rights 
than they bought.”273  
The Court in Mahon thus announced several key principles that 
now form the foundation of regulatory takings jurisprudence. The 
Court clarified that a property owner has a constitutionally protected 
right to conduct an economically viable use and therefore the govern-
ment could not deprive a property owner of all commercially viable use 
without payment of just compensation. This idea is implicit in Justice 
Holmes’s statement that a law that made the mining of certain coal 
commercially impracticable was functionally equivalent “for constitu-
tional purposes . . . [to] appropriating or destroying” the regulated 
property.274 Justice Holmes also subtly introduced a quantitative test 
for resolving regulatory takings claims through his reliance on dimi-
nution in value. 275 Instead of following the traditional approach of fo-
cusing on whether a physical invasion or direct appropriation existed, 
Justice Holmes looked at the quantity or degree of interference with 
the property.276 His approach allowed courts to consider the severity  
of the impact of the regulation on the property’s value when no perma-
nent physical invasion or appropriation existed.  
In addition to bringing regulatory action within the scope of the 
Takings Clause, Holmes’s more pragmatic approach shifted the focus 
of the takings inquiry from clear benchmarks like direct physical  
invasions to utilitarian considerations, defined in part by the “daily 
experience[] of people.”277 This approach eventually allowed the Court 
to address the problem of unfairness resulting from the combined  
effect of the traditional approach’s refusal to award compensation  
unless a physical invasion existed and its refusal to allow recovery for 
consequential loss. Under Holmes’s solution to the problem of 
 
Others have read the principle more broadly to include benefits to the community as a whole 
or to the landowner over time. See, e.g., id. at 419, 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the value of the mine should be viewed as a whole); see SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 32; 
see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 744, 803 (1999) 
(describing reciprocity of advantage as a theory of social responsibility involving offsetting 
benefits). 
 272. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 414. 
 275. Accord SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 31. 
 276. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.  
 277. SKOURAS, supra note 169, at 29, 31–32. 
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unfairness, serious regulatory interference became functionally equiv-
alent to a physical taking. By freeing regulatory interference claims 
from the requirement of a physical invasion, the Court allowed  
recovery of general damages even when no physical invasion existed.278 
Neither private rights nor public interests were absolute. Instead,  
Justice Holmes preferred a functionalist approach over a formalistic 
approach, fact- and context-based analysis over categorical reasoning, 
balancing over precise line drawing, and a pragmatic, relativist  
approach over an absolutist approach.279 Although earlier cases had 
discussed the importance of economically viable use and generally had 
observed that government action could not deprive property owners of 
all such use, Mahon actually gave life to the idea—allowing it to stand 
on its own without a physical invasion. Much of the source of that life 
came from Justice Holmes’s willingness to subordinate the public  
interest when the economic impact of government regulation was 
great. Over time the ultimate effect of Justice Holmes’s paradigm shift 
was the development of a doctrine that limits government’s ability to 
regulate property under the Takings Clause. 
The evolution of regulatory takings thus reflects some important 
conceptual and theoretical connections to physical takings. Those ties 
are captured through the functional equivalence logic and include the 
in rem basis of takings liability, unjust enrichment and the concern for 
windfalls, the importance of the public interest and promotion of the 
public good, and limitations on liability imposed through foreseeability 
and the consequential damage doctrine. Over time, as the regulatory 
takings doctrine has taken on a life of its own, the defining theories 
and concepts have become unmoored. Without an adequate connection 
to its own history, it is no wonder that modern regulatory takings anal-
ysis is riddled with inconsistencies, perplexing results, and the contin-
ued mixing of due process and takings analysis. It is no wonder that 
the regulatory takings doctrine has lost sight of its inherent limits. 
IV.   THE INHERENT LIMITS OF  
REGULATORY TAKINGS  
Because of the lost connection between regulatory takings and its 
defining concepts, modern regulatory takings decisions have produced 
unexpected and confusing results. New forms of takings, for example, 
have emerged that circle back to the earlier substantive due process 
analysis of confiscatory practices. Nexus reviews conducted in evalu-
ating regulatory takings challenges have demanded an “essential 
nexus” between a legitimate state interest and a government condition 
 
 278. For an in-depth discussion of how Mahon came to be viewed as a regulatory takings 
case, see Treanor, supra note 170, at 861–71.  
 279. See id. at 854-55, 860–61. 
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imposed on a property owner, as well as “rough proportionality”  
between the condition and the projected impact of the proposed use.280 
That the Court announced the nexus reviews in cases involving  
required transfers of easements to the public suggests that the circling 
back was intentional.281 The Court could have simply found a physical 
taking but chose to say more. When the Court in Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Management District extended the nexus review, as a 
guiding principle, to situations involving permit denials, the right to 
just compensation was protected even in the absence of an actual tak-
ing.282 The Court in Koontz explained that the essential nexus and 
rough proportionality tests applied regardless of whether government 
approves the permit or instead denies it after the applicant refused to 
meet the condition.283 Otherwise government could evade these limita-
tions on its regulatory powers “by phrasing its demands for property 
as conditions precedent to permit approval.” 284 As the Court explained, 
the absence of an actual taking misses the point. “Extortionate  
demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of 
the Takings Clause not because they take property but because they 
impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without 
just compensation.”285 However, because the permit was denied after 
the unconstitutional condition was refused, no actual taking occurred, 
and therefore the Fifth Amendment’s remedy of just compensation 
could not apply.286  
The decision in Koontz is confusing and perplexing. How could  
the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation be violated when no 
compensation could be paid under the federal Constitution because of 
the absence of an actual taking? Is a constitutional right without a 
constitutional remedy really a right? The decision also sends mixed 
messages about the role of substantive due process analysis in the land 
use regulatory context. Without conducting any nexus review of its 
own, the Koontz Court extended the takings nexus review tests to  
monetary exactions in spite of the Court’s earlier decisions in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel287 and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.288 In Eastern En-
terprises a majority of justices agreed that a government-imposed  
 
 280. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994). 
 281. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (requiring the dedication of a public greenway); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring a public easement to walk 
along the beach). 
 282. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602–03 (2013).  
 283. Id. at 2595. 
 284. Id.  
 285. Id. at 2589–90.  
 286. Id. at 2597. 
 287. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).  
 288. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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obligation to pay money could not provide the basis for a taking when 
it "does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest."289  
In Lingle the Court stated that a means/ends nexus review normally 
belonged under the Due Process Clause and that the substantially  
advance means/end review was “not a valid method of identifying  
regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just com-
pensation.”290 As the Court in Lingle explained, the means/end review 
“probes the regulation’s underlying validity” and “reveals nothing 
about the magnitude or character of the burden a regulation imposes 
upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information 
about how any regulatory burden is distributed.”291 The review thus 
“does not help to identify those regulations whose effects are function-
ally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private 
property.”292 
Then, in the 2015 Horne v. Department of Agriculture decision, the 
Court applied physical takings analysis to a regulatory setting.293 In 
Horne the Court concluded that a physical taking occurred because an 
agricultural law required raisin growers to reserve a percentage of 
their crop for their regulatory body to manage and control in years 
when market conditions necessitated government intervention to  
stabilize the raisin market.294 The Court explained that the law effec-
tuated both a physical surrender and a transfer of title.295 The reserve 
requirement thus deprived the growers of their “entire ‘bundle’ of  
property rights . . . ‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’” the  
reserved raisins.296 It did not matter whether economically viable use 
remained,297 nor whether participation in the regulated market was 
voluntary.298 That the raisin growers were in a protected market,  
receiving windfalls under the government program, was irrelevant to 
determining whether a physical taking existed.299 The Court refused 
to consider any windfall received by the grower for the sale of the crop 
not subject to the reservation requirement under its physical takings 
analysis—not even if the price far exceeded what it would have been 
 
 289. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540 (opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); see 
id. at 554–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The ‘private property' upon which the [Takings] 
Clause traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or intellectual property"). 
 290. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. 
 291. Id. at 542–43. 
 292. Id. at 542. 
 293. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).  
 294. Id. at 2428. 
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
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 297. Id. at 2429. 
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without regulation—because “the value of the interest [in the reserved 
raisins] depends on the discretion of the taker.”300 Nor did the fungible 
nature of the property matter in considering whether the property was 
physically taken. Each raisin apparently counted in Horne. The gov-
ernment’s requirement of physically setting aside a certain percentage 
of raisins constituted a physical taking even though actual separation 
was the only way to keep track of different batches of fungible property 
and even though the only economically viable use of tangible, fungible, 
perishable property was a timely sale.301 Nor did the Court view the 
relationship between growers and their regulatory body more like a 
trust arrangement, with enough of a legal interest being transferred 
to the regulatory body to enable the trustee to fulfill the purpose of the 
trust to stabilize the raisin market.  
The role of the consequential damages doctrine in physical takings 
analysis also has been overlooked. The doctrine highlights the rele-
vance of foreseeability, a concern for unjust enrichment and windfalls, 
and the in rem nature of takings protection. Courts feared that  
property owners would receive windfalls if consequential damages 
were awarded, defeating the public interest in important public works 
and public improvement projects.302 Even when a condemnation or 
physical taking has occurred, diminution in value is not generally  
recoverable as long as substantial enjoyment and use remain.303 This 
tolerance for some adverse economic impact in the interest of promot-
ing important public interests is slowly being eroded through the  
adoption of per se rules (where consideration of the public interest  
is not even allowed), the strengthening of the takings nexus review 
(requiring greater precision than normally required under substantive 
due process in the land use regulatory setting), and the expansion of 
physical takings analysis in regulatory settings (circumventing the  
inability of property owners to recover for partial regulatory takings). 
This erosion ignores the in rem nature of protection under the Takings 
Clause—which became part of regulatory takings through the logic of 
functional equivalence used to recognize regulatory takings. That in 
rem nature limits just compensation to the actual property taken and 
does not include related but personal interests of the owner. 
Regulatory takings differ from physical takings in some ways that, 
if ignored, would expand protection from regulation to the point where 
the public good would suffer. The eminent domain clause was ratified 
 
 300. Id. at 2429. 
 301. Lynda L. Butler, The Horne Dilemma: Protecting Property’s Richness and Frontiers, 
75 MD. L. REV. 787, 799–800 (2016). For further discussion of the Horne decision, compare 
id. with Mark Kelman, Untangling Horne; Resuscitating Nollan, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 
ONLINE 50 (2018). 
 302. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.  
 303. See Trans. Co. v. Chi., 99 U.S. 635 (1878).  
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at a time when the nation’s resources, conditions, and public needs 
were much different than today’s. The economy was still developing 
and many threats to survival existed. State governments used land 
distribution laws to promote economic development, settlement and 
westward expansion, agricultural production, military service, and 
many other core needs.304 Those conditions have changed—so much so 
that the public good now requires regulatory policies that address the 
costs of relentless land development and resource use. Allowing the 
scope of regulatory takings to expand without consideration of the logic 
and nature of takings protection would undermine the public good. The 
logic of function equivalence provides a compelling reason for recogniz-
ing regulatory takings, for economic regulation can ruin the value of  
a person’s property. Yet government must be able to regulate land  
use to promote important public health, welfare, and safety interests 
in response to changing social and natural conditions. Under our  
social contract, property owners have long accepted some diminution 
in value, some interference with economic expectations, and some  
inconvenience. 
The differences between regulatory and physical takings attest to 
why the regulatory takings doctrine must remain limited in scope. 
Those differences arise because the functional equivalence logic first 
used to extend takings protection to regulatory settings does not fit 
perfectly. Without an appreciation for that logical context, regulatory 
takings analysis becomes unmoored from its history—a history that 
helps to keep the analysis grounded and the implications of the differ-
ences in check.  In contrast to physical takings, regulatory takings set-
tings generally do not involve an affirmative use but rather  promotion 
of a legitimate public purpose through limitations on use.305 Once 
courts were willing to find a regulatory taking from a legal restriction 
without worrying about public use, it was only a matter of time before 
the meaning of public use became synonymous with public purpose.306 
A regulatory taking also requires substantial or total interference with 
a property right.307 Inconvenience or minor interference is not enough 
to find a regulatory taking because otherwise government could not 
improve the public condition. Even a minor but permanent physical 
invasion, however, is a per se physical taking no matter how important 
the public interest. When that minor physical taking becomes part  
of a complex regulatory program developed to protect the property 
owners’ agricultural business (for example, the raisin market),  
 
 304. See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 164, ch. 8 (discussing the roles of Virginia’s 
land distribution laws).  
 305. See LAITOS, supra note 211, § 13.04[A][1]. 
 306. See Haw. Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (“The ‘public use’ 
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.”). 
 307. See LAITOS, supra note 211, §§ 12.02, 12.06.  
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minor economic impact suddenly becomes compensable through  
the physical taking concept. Eventually, the logic underlying the  
regulatory takings doctrine is overlooked or misunderstood, and the 
doctrine takes on a life of its own.  
The denominator problem provides a powerful example of the  
confusion that can result from continuing expansion of the regulatory 
takings doctrine. The choice of denominator could be used to further 
expand the doctrine well beyond its defining concepts. If the denomi-
nator is only the affected property, any regulation preventing use of a 
portion of the property owner’s rights would effect a regulatory taking, 
and important police power action could become too costly to pursue. 
Yet no property owner has a reasonable expectation of receiving max-
imum profits from each part or from the whole. The moral outrage over 
losing the right to mine support columns when subsidence would harm 
public goods or another’s surface property should not be that great if 
the coal already mined produced sizable returns. The outrage over los-
ing the right to sell the reserved raisins in the primary market surely 
would not compare to the pain of losing the value of an entire crop in 
an unprotected market that has far too many raisins. Receiving less 
than full value for each reserved raisin would produce a partial eco-
nomic loss and could effect a taking unless the entire regulatory con-
text is considered: the subsidized market existing for the growers as 
well as the public, the reasonable return received on the remaining 
crop, the voluntary participation in the market, and the economic 
value of the grower’s whole crop. By choosing to protect the grower 
against the possibility of a glutted market, government should not find 
itself liable for controlling the supply of a perishable, fungible crop 
grown only for sale in that protected market.  
Courts applying the regulatory takings doctrine thus need to recog-
nize the doctrine’s inherent limits. Ignoring those limits has led to 
much confusion and inconsistency in takings jurisprudence. Courts 
handling regulatory takings claims involving land need to think  
objectively and comprehensively about the property, considering how 
the regulated or proposed use adversely affects the land’s connection 
to the surrounding ecosystem and community. Well-tailored laws that 
address adverse impacts generally should not pose a regulatory taking 
even if the regulations cause diminution in value, lower profits, or 
more restricted use. Laws governing property rights should not be 
locked in time in the sense of dealing with changing conditions and 
knowledge about adverse impacts. Nor should the legal system ignore 
the relationship between the whole and its parts—both in the physical 
and economic sense—simply because of how a lot line is drawn or a 
temporal space is defined. The whole never should be treated as less 
than the sum of the parts. If, for example, the interaction of the parts 
is being ignored in ways that threaten or undermine the whole, the 
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part should not serve as the benchmark for determining whether a  
law addressing that threat results in a total loss of economically viable 
use. Otherwise the property owner could unjustly receive windfalls at 
the expense of the whole. Similarly, in defining the economic whole, 
courts should ask whether contiguous parcels under common owner-
ship form an integrated economic unit.308 An important inquiry in con-
ducting this analysis would be whether a legal principle being  
applied to define a tract’s boundaries or dimensions has independent 
legal significance outside of the takings context.309 In Murr, for exam-
ple, the merger doctrine had routinely been applied in land use law to 
contiguous, non-conforming lots under common ownership.310  
Another idea would be to borrow Justice Kagan’s idea of using a 
risk calculus for determining when a heightened review or per se  
approach is in order for regulatory takings analysis. Justice Kagan 
raised the idea in her opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert—a free speech 
case involving a sign ordinance.311 She objected to the “high bar” set by 
the content-based approach of the majority, which would impose the 
strict scrutiny standard on virtually all sign ordinances because they 
regulate according to specific types of subject matter.312 Even historic 
signs, street addresses, speed limits, and other information-conveying 
signs would need to meet the stringent test.313 Justice Kagan instead 
would apply “strict scrutiny to facially content-based regulations of 
speech” when “there is any ‘realistic possibility that official suppres-
sion of ideas [the rationale for the strict scrutiny test] is afoot.’ ”314 In 
the regulatory takings context, the key question would be to ask 
whether there is a realistic possibility that a regulation is functionally 
equivalent to a physical taking—raising the same types of risks and 
dangers posed by physical takings and speaking to the core purposes 
of the eminent domain clause. These core dangers include the risk  
of majoritarian exploitation or manipulation of property (for example, 
to lower the value of the property before condemnation), the risk of 
favoritism (indicating the absence of reciprocity of advantage or any 
 
 308. See LAITOS, supra note 211, § 18.03[D].  
 309. See Stuart Banner, Murr and Merger, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 185, 
186, 190–98 (2018).  
 310. See id. at 186, 190–98 (explaining this practice). The doctrine also has routinely 
been applied under the common law of property to clean up title when an owner acquires, at 
separate points in time, what would amount to total ownership rights in a tract or what 
would make the existence of a use right unnecessary. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY 223, 295 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining how merger is used to end easements or cove-
nants when one party separately acquires both the benefitted estate and the burdened es-
tate). 
 311. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236–39 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 312. Id. at 2236–37.  
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
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evening out of the benefits and burdens of economic life), and more 
generally the realistic possibility of outrage over an unfair distribution 
of regulatory burdens imposed on a property owner. The point is that 
regulatory takings analysis needs to be tied to the same core concepts, 
risks, and dangers as physical takings. Otherwise the corollary concept 
of regulatory takings will become much more expansive and unwieldy 
than the original defining concept of physical takings.  
 
 
